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Reporting on electoral violence  
in Nigerian news media: “Saying it 
as it is”?
Leila Demarest and Arnim Langer
Abstract: While Nigeria has a vibrant press media landscape, freedom of the press 
is only rated as “partly free” by Freedom House, mostly due to political influences on 
reporting. Yet the extent to which these influences affect the quality of reporting 
remains insufficiently investigated. We address this gap by analyzing how three news-
papers with different political affiliations report on conflict in the run-up to the 2015 
elections. Our analyses indicate that biases in reporting are generally limited, and that 
while political pressures are real, they are most evident in editorial choices.
Résumé: Alors que le paysage médiatique au Nigéria est dynamique, la liberté de la 
presse n’est qualifiée que de « partiellement libre » par Freedom House, principale-
ment en raison d’influences politiques sur les reportages. Cependant, l’impact de ces 
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Introduction
Nigeria is characterized by a vibrant national press media with a long his-
tory of democratic resistance to authoritarian rulers, both under military 
and civilian regimes. Since the installation of the Fourth Republic in 1999, 
Nigerian news media have continued to pressure the government for 
accountability and have frequently revealed cases of political corruption. 
Nevertheless, with regard to freedom of the press, Nigeria has only been 
rated as “partly free” since the start of the Freedom House index in 2002. 
The main reason for this score is that Nigerian media, and particularly news 
media, are still sensitive to political pressures due to, among others, media 
ownership structures, dependence on advertisement revenue, and low 
journalist wages (Ciboh 2017; Freedom House 2016; Olukoyun 2004; Ojo 
2003). These are important factors that can undermine impartial and 
objective reporting. Yet the extent to which they actually bias reporting, or 
worse, turn news media into tools for political propaganda, remains insuffi-
ciently investigated. This study aims to address this gap by empirically assess-
ing how Nigerian newspapers reported on electoral violence in the run-up 
to the 2015 general elections and determining whether there are clear dif-
ferences between newspapers with different political affiliations.
Previous research in Western settings has already shown that conflict 
reporting can be influenced by the political affiliations of media outlets. As 
Christian Davenport (2010) demonstrated in his influential analysis of news 
reporting on Black Panther-government relations in the United States, 
influences sur la qualité des reportages reste insuffisamment étudié. Nous comblons 
cette lacune en analysant la manière dont trois journaux de différentes affiliations 
politiques font état des conflits en préparation des élections de 2015. Nos analyses 
indiquent que les préjugés dans les reportages sont généralement limités et que, si les 
pressions politiques sont réelles, elles sont plus évidentes dans les choix éditoriaux.
Resumo: Embora a imprensa nigeriana apresente uma atividade intensa, a Freedom 
House apenas atribuiu a classificação de “parcialmente livre” à liberdade de imp-
rensa no país, sobretudo devido às influências políticas na atividade jornalística. 
Porém, continua a não existir uma investigação suficientemente profunda sobre o 
grau em que estas influências condicionam a qualidade jornalística. Procurando 
colmatar esta lacuna, debruçamo-nos aqui sobre o modo como três jornais de difer-
entes afiliações políticas abordaram o conflito na corrida às eleições de 2015. 
A nossa análise sugere que, de um modo geral, há pouco enviesamento político nas 
peças jornalísticas e que, apesar de serem reais, as pressões políticas se fazem sentir 
sobretudo nas escolhas editoriais.
Keywords: electoral violence; Nigeria; freedom of the press; news reporting; 
political bias
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newspapers can represent reality differently by choosing to report certain 
incidents over others. He compared the way that conservative/establishment 
newspapers reported on conflict between the Black Panther movement and 
authorities versus reporting by dissident/black newspapers and found sub-
stantial differences in the representation of conflict dynamics. Yet, newspa-
pers can also represent the same events in different ways and put the blame 
for violence on the adversary (Earl et al. 2004:72–73). Hence while news 
media are professionally obligated to report the truth, the realities as they 
are represented, particularly with regard to conflict, can be very different. 
Potential repercussions are that news media may aggravate political divi-
sions or even support the use of violence, as was the case with the Rwandan 
“Milles Collines” radio station, for instance.
Electoral violence reporting is particularly sensitive to political biases in 
news media. Electoral violence itself can be defined as a sub-category of 
political violence in which the aim of the violence is to influence upcoming 
elections or to challenge the results of recently concluded elections 
(Goldsmith 2015:822; Höglund 2009; Laakso 2007:227–28). Forms of elec-
toral violence may include the vandalization of campaign materials and 
offices, clashes between supporter groups, or even assassinations. By selec-
tively reporting on electoral violence, for example by overreporting the 
adversary’s use of violence relative to the reporting entity’s own party, it is 
also possible to influence citizens’ choices on whether to vote, whom to 
vote for, and whether to accept the results of an election as legitimate. 
By focusing specifically on electoral violence—a continuous feature of 
Nigerian multiparty democracy since 1999 (Human Rights Watch 2011; 
Lewis & Kew 2015; Omotola 2010; Orji 2017)—this study endeavors to as-
sess the degree of political bias in Nigerian news media.
Empirically, this study makes use of both quantitative and qualitative 
data. The analyses focus on the 2015 elections, which brought Muhammadu 
Buhari from the All Progressives Congress (APC) to power. Although these 
elections have been regarded as some of the best managed elections in the 
country (Lewis & Kew 2015), violence nonetheless marred the political 
competition. Furthermore, the elections were run in the midst of the Boko 
Haram crisis that took place in northeastern Nigeria and led to massive loss 
of life, infrastructure destruction, and internal displacement. Interestingly, 
the Boko Haram crisis has also been linked to electoral competition. We 
focus specifically on the pre-electoral period, as this is where we expect 
most differences between newspapers if their reporting is indeed aimed at 
influencing the elections. A second reason we focus on the pre-electoral 
period is that incumbent President Goodluck Jonathan of the Peoples 
Democratic Party (PDP) quickly acknowledged his defeat and no serious 
incidents occurred in the post-election period.
We first conducted quantitative analyses of electoral violence reporting 
based on a unique dataset on conflict events in Nigeria between April 2014 
and March 2015, the one-year period before the presidential elections. This 
dataset allowed for an investigation of the representation of electoral 
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violence in newspapers with affiliations to the PDP and the APC, the two 
major parties in the elections. The newspapers analyzed include The 
Guardian, This Day, and The Nation. We analyzed whether newspapers dif-
fered in the events they reported, with a specific focus on events in which 
the PDP or the APC were depicted as victims of violence. Moreover, we in-
vestigated whether event reporting changed as the elections drew nearer.
Our quantitative analyses indicate that while slight biases do appear, 
the three newspapers generally paint a similar reality, with the PDP more 
likely to use violence against the opposition. These results indicate that 
despite political pressures, Nigerian news media can be considered fairly 
objective and neutral. This observation is also supported by interviews with 
journalists and editors, as well as by qualitative analyses of reports on elec-
toral violence. While acknowledging that “he who pays the piper deter-
mines the tune,” media professionals also affirm that when it comes to 
electoral violence, they “say it as it is.” Indeed, while political ties might 
influence editorial choices (including front page choices, headlines etc.), 
our research shows that there is no deliberate misreporting of electoral vio-
lence. Event reports themselves also demonstrate this editorial political 
preference while affirming overall attention to objectivity. Nonetheless, 
dependence on political party sources for electoral violence reporting and 
a need to balance party statements may in some cases undermine the 
media’s ability to present the truth with regard to perpetrator and victim.
Our findings suggest that while the degree of Nigeria’s press freedom 
is rated as “partly free,” the standards of the journalistic profession are still 
held high. This adds nuance to recent research by Wale Adebanwi (2016) 
on sectionalism in the Nigerian press. According to Adebanwi, Nigerian 
print media have historically represented political, and in particular eth-
noregional, interests and have not been able to overcome sectional divides, 
even in the Fourth Republic. Indeed, in his opinion:
Despite the heroic efforts of the press in ensuring the restoration of dem-
ocratic rule and its critical role in monitoring democratically elected offi-
cials and institutions, on a few critical occasions, the Nigerian press renders 
itself totally captive to ethno-regional and ethno-religious passions and 
calculations. (Adebanwi 2016:223)
We find that sectionalism appeared limited with regard to the reporting of 
electoral violence in the run-up of the 2015 elections, indicating that not all 
critical political events are subject to this dynamic. Adebanwi focuses more 
on editorial narratives, however, while we find that reporting as such 
appears relatively reliable.
The results of our research also suggest that Nigerian news media 
can be valuable and valid sources for studying political violence pro-
cesses. As the study of electoral violence has picked up in recent years, 
several new data projects in the field have been developed to track inci-
dents of electoral violence, particularly in Africa (Birch & Muchlinski 2017; 
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Hyde & Marinov 2015; Salehyan et al. 2012; Straus & Taylor 2012). While 
these new projects offer interesting cross-national comparisons, none of 
them makes use of local news sources. These can nonetheless provide more 
fine-grained information on violent events (e.g., Demarest & Langer 2018), 
while the risk of political biases in these types of sources appears limited.
The following section first briefly discusses how Nigeria’s press media 
are linked to party politics, and electoral competition in particular. Next 
there is a description of the quantitative data collection process and meth-
odology, followed by the analyses and discussion of the results. The penul-
timate section contextualizes these results with reference to interviews with 
Nigerian journalists and editors and examples of reports on electoral vio-
lence, while the final section concludes.
Politics and the media in Nigeria
Political influence on the media
Freedom House’s Freedom of the Press rating relies on regional and coun-
try experts who assign scores to a country based on the legal environment, 
including the protection of journalists and how media laws are imple-
mented; the political environment, focusing on political pressures on con-
tent through, among others, ownership structures and sourcing; and the 
economic environment, including production costs, advertisement depen-
dence, and sensitivity to corruption. Most countries in Africa have a “partly 
free” or “not free” rating. For the year 2017, Nigeria had an overall score of 
51/100, with higher scores indicating less freedom. In particular, the polit-
ical environment received a high score, similar to scores in previous years.1
Indeed, while Nigeria has one of the most vibrant press media land-
scapes in Africa today, its news media continue to experience political 
dependencies. On the one hand, the press performs a strong watchdog 
role in the Fourth Republic by revealing political corruption scandals 
and promoting accountability (Freedom House 2016; Olukoyun 2004; Ojo 
2003). This role can be seen as a remnant of their opposition campaigns to 
previous military dictatorships. On the other hand, the media remain 
sensitive to political and ethno-regional pressures in their reporting. 
A much-cited example to support this claim (e.g., Jibo & Okoosi-Simbine 
2003:183–84; Olukoyun 2004:83; Yusha'u 2015:144–45) is that southern 
newspapers were virulent in their critiques of the northern Speaker of the 
House when they found out that he had lied about his age, making him 
ineligible to be elected to the House, and about his University of Toronto 
degree. A southern Yoruba senator, Bola Tinubu, faced much less criticism, 
however, when it turned out he had lied about his University of Chicago 
degree.
Historically, independence leaders such as Nnamdi Azikiwe and 
Obafemi Awolowo set up a number of newspapers not only to promote 
the independence cause, but also to increase their political influence 
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(e.g., Adebanwi 2016:109–10; Coleman 1963; Jibo & Okoosi-Simbine 
2003:182–83; Sklar 2004). Moshood Abiola, the winner of the aborted 1993 
presidential elections, also saw the ownership of a newspaper as an impor-
tant tool for a political leader (Ojo 2003:836). Yet private newspapers as 
well remain sensitive to political pressures, as they are generally dependent 
on advertisement from politicians and affiliated businesses. Low salaries for 
journalists, along with persistent delays in payments, also encourage “the 
brown envelope system” (Olukoyun 2004:78) by which politicians bribe 
journalists to write favorable reports about them (see also Freedom House 
2016). Furthermore, journalists are primarily dependent on political 
sources for information, both government officials and political party rep-
resentatives (Ciboh 2017). Finally, press media and journalists also face 
harassment and violence from disgruntled politicians and their supporters 
(Freedom House 2016). All these dynamics encourage self-censorship 
among the Nigerian press media. This is at times accompanied by actual 
censorship, for instance to prevent the circulation of reports that might be 
damaging to influential people or the government.
The media and elections
Since the return to democracy in 1999, Nigeria has held multiple federal, 
state, and local legislative and executive elections. Presidential elections 
have been held five times: in 1999, 2003, 2007, 2011, and 2015. These 
elections have often engendered violence. The inaugurating elections of 
1999, which brought former military ruler Olusegun Obasanjo to power, 
still passed in relative calm, although they were characterized by wide-
spread irregularities and fraud (Kew 1999). The 2003 elections were again 
won by Obasanjo and also saw manipulations such as voter card fraud and 
ballot theft as well as voter intimidation (Lewis 2003). Relatively few 
deaths occurred during the electoral process, yet severe and lethal vio-
lence in Rivers state could be linked to electoral politics (Human Rights 
Watch 2007).
The 2007 general elections in Nigeria were regarded as seriously 
flawed by international and domestic observers, and a step back in Nigeria’s 
democratization process (Egwu et al. 2009; Rawlence & Albin-Lackey 2007; 
Obi 2008). The legitimacy of the elections was curtailed not only by clear 
cases of fraud—in some areas almost no actual voting took place—but also 
by the level of political violence witnessed. The number of deaths due 
to electoral violence is estimated at between 55 and 300. As Obasanjo’s 
attempt at a third presidential term had failed (Suberu 2007), PDP candi-
date Umaru Yar’Adua gained the presidency.
Yar’Adua died of natural causes in 2010 and was succeeded by vice-
president Jonathan. Jonathan himself was elected president in 2011. The 
2011 electoral process was generally regarded as free and fair and an 
improvement after the 2007 elections (Akhaine 2011), but severe violence 
erupted after Buhari lost to Jonathan. While electoral violence in 2007 
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was most pronounced in the southwest, southeast and south-south, in par-
ticular in Ondo, Osun, and Ekiti states (Omotola 2010), severe electoral 
violence in 2011 took place in the north of Nigeria, specifically the states of 
Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Jigawa, Kaduna, Kano, Katsina, Niger, 
Sokoto, Yobe, and Zamfara. This violence is estimated to have claimed 
around 800 lives (Human Rights Watch 2011). Part of the reason the vio-
lence was so severe is that it took on an ethno-religious dimension, with 
patterns of violence overlapping with prior fault lines between Christian 
and Muslim groupings (Angerbrandt 2018).
The 2015 elections did not bring a repetition of the severe violence of 
2011 (Lewis & Kew 2015; Orji 2017). Still, around fifty deaths were reported. 
Rivers state in particular remains a hotbed of electoral violence. Many 
results of the 2015 national legislative elections have been declared void 
because of malpractices in Rivers (Oluokun 2015). The 2015 presidential 
elections brought the APC candidate, former military ruler Buhari, to power. 
Jonathan quickly accepted defeat and no serious forms of post-electoral 
violence occurred.
In general, the media have played an important role in election 
monitoring and violence deterrence (e.g., EU election observer mission 
2015:22–25; Lewis 2003:142; NDI 2011:42–43; Rawlence & Albin-Lackey 
2007:499). Nonetheless, political influences have also arisen during elec-
tion times. This has already been shown for media coverage of parties and 
candidates. While the Electoral Act requires equal media coverage for all 
political parties, there is generally an incumbent advantage in coverage. 
In the run-up to the 2011 elections, for instance, about forty broadcasting 
stations were fined for violating the Electoral Act (NDI 2011:42–43). 
Government-owned media clearly represented the incumbent party in a 
favorable light, but even private media gave greatest coverage to the 
ruling party. The same patterns were observable in the run-up to the 2015 
elections (EU election observer mission 2015:22–25). In some cases, the 
PDP received up to 80 percent of electoral coverage. While dispropor-
tionate media attention for the incumbent President and his party may be 
a sign of political pressure on media houses, it may also be a direct result 
of the widespread interest most people have in the President’s actions. 
Similar incumbent dominance was found for political advertisements in 
news media, however, indicating an economic advantage as well (Alawode & 
Adesanya 2016).
The literature suggests that Nigerian news media are sensitive to 
political pressures during election times. While previous research has high-
lighted differences in media attention and advertisement between incum-
bent and opposition, this study focuses in particular on electoral violence. 
This focus allows an analysis of the content of newspaper reporting more in 
depth, focusing on how reporters actually engage with politically sensitive 
forms of violence. The following section explains the methodological 
framework for the newspaper content analyses, beginning with the newspa-
per selection and then addressing the coding process.
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Methodological framework
Newspaper selection
As mentioned previously, Nigeria has a vibrant media landscape. Print 
media, our primary data source in this article, are widely available, and 
the market is competitive. A large number of newspapers is distributed 
on a (relatively) national scale. Furthermore, Nigerian newspapers often 
publish issues on a daily basis, with newspapers commonly counting 
more than sixty pages. As papers are sold at low prices (200 to 250 Naira), 
most income stems from advertisements. This also leads to the high 
page counts. Newspapers are primarily targeted at an upper middle class 
and elite audience. Publishing houses are predominantly located in the 
south of the country. The most important northern newspaper is The 
Daily Trust.
Our selection of newspapers was guided by two principles. Firstly, we 
aimed to select newspapers which were affiliated with either the PDP or the 
APC as the main parties contesting the elections. The second criterion was 
that newspapers be relatively national in scope and have a wide readership. 
This excluded local, small-scale newspapers and party outlets. The major 
challenge was determining affiliations or “sympathy” toward a political 
party. For one of the newspapers selected, The Nation, this was more 
obvious. The Nation is a widely-read newspaper in Nigeria and is hence also 
collected in national and university library archives. Furthermore, its own-
ership is linked to Tinubu, who is the major APC strongman in the south-
west region (see also the section “Political influence on the media”). The 
newspaper can hence be considered an APC (and previously Action 
Congress Nigeria) outlet (Ademilokun & Taiwo 2013:452). The northern 
newspaper, The Daily Trust is privately owned, but could also have been con-
sidered as sympathetic towards the APC, based on its status as voice of the 
north, which is Buhari’s regional origin. At the time of our data collection, 
however, we did not have access to the Daily Trust archives in Abuja due to 
travel restrictions.
The selection of newspapers which are favorable to the PDP was less 
obvious, but after consultations with Nigerian communication scholars at 
the University of Lagos (UNILAG), we decided to select two newspapers, 
The Guardian and This Day. Both are privately owned, but as mentioned in 
the previous section, this does not preclude political sympathies. The 
Guardian is sometimes considered to be representing the regional interests 
of the south-south zone (Ette 2018:177; Yusha'u 2015), the region former 
President Jonathan hails from. Furthermore, Sunday O. Alawode and 
Olufunke O. Adesanya (2016) find that with regard to electoral advertise-
ment there was more inclusion of PDP-sponsored messages than APC 
sponsored messages in The Guardian in the run-up to the elections, in 
contrast to the Daily Trust. Our own observations also indicated that PDP 
advertisement was substantially more prominent in The Guardian and 
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This Day than APC advertisement, while PDP advertisement in The Nation 
was extremely rare. Nonetheless, the EU election observer mission report 
(2015:25) states that election coverage in The Guardian was relatively bal-
anced. Overall, whether The Guardian is an independent outlet or leans 
more towards the PDP can be debated. Nevertheless, Guardian editorship 
also states that many people consider them pro-PDP (Interview AS, Lagos, 
December 18, 2017).
According to the EU election observation report (2015:25), coverage 
in This Day was also balanced. Yet This Day owner Nduka Obaigbena has 
also been implicated in a major arms deal scandal under the Jonathan 
administration (Premium Times 2017). Moreover, This Day salary payments 
to journalists are extremely irregular and low, indicating a potential for 
brown envelope journalism (Udo 2015). The extent to which reporting 
on party violence is biased remains, of course, the empirical question of 
this study.
Coding process
For the purposes of this study we established a dataset on conflict events 
in Nigeria based on events recorded in The Guardian, This Day, and The 
Nation. The dataset covers a wide range of events, including peaceful dem-
onstrations, riots, violent clashes, battles between the national army and 
Boko Haram, violence against civilians, and terrorist attacks. As several 
other datasets also focus on these (sub-)types of events in Nigeria, it is 
worth highlighting some of the differences between our dataset and other 
data projects such as ACLED (Raleigh et al. 2010) and the Nigeria Watch 
project.2
The ACLED dataset has recorded events of political violence in most 
sub-Saharan African countries since 1997, with monthly updates. Besides 
international news wires and NGO reports, ACLED relies on online infor-
mation from a range of Nigerian newspapers. Nigeria Watch, maintained at 
the University of Ibadan, has recorded violent events since June 2006 and 
draws from ten national daily newspapers. These datasets do not allow us to 
study the effects of political orientation on the selection of events into the 
news (“selection bias”) or on how events are described (“description bias”) 
(Earl et al. 2004), however. Firstly, datasets record the news source on which 
an event was based, but they do not provide information on whether events 
were only included in that source or also reported by other newspapers 
(selection bias). Secondly, the event data do not take into account differ-
ences in how an event is reported between news reports and newspapers 
(description bias). Thirdly, the coding scheme does not allow for possible 
contestation over the responsibility for the use of violence in events. The 
coding scheme developed for our dataset does allow these distinctions. 
Finally, while ACLED captures different forms of violence, including 
forms of vandalism, Nigeria Watch only includes lethal events, including 
accidents.
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To sample the events, we consulted the hard-copy versions of the news-
papers at the University of Lagos (UNILAG) library as well as additional 
data archives based in the city.3 Relevant news reports were scanned and 
saved to a hard drive. To select reports, coders were instructed to check 
for relevant content by reading through the newspapers. A list of key words 
aided coders in the scanning process, although the presence of a key word 
was no condition for selection if the event was clearly relevant for inclusion. 
Opinion pieces, interviews, and editorials were explicitly excluded, as the 
focus lay on news reporting practices. The period of study was April 2014 to 
March 2015. The 2015 presidential elections took place on March 28-29, 
2015. Hence, the data cover the one-year period before the general elec-
tions. Events which fall outside this date range but were reported in the 
newspapers within this period of study were also excluded.
Events were coded by the principal investigators and research assis-
tants following the codebook developed by the authors. The coding process 
followed the research strategy proposed by Weidmann and Rød (2015), 
which consists of coding each report separately in order to investigate 
differences between them, rather than coding only one report of an 
event and leaving other reports aside. Each time coders came across a 
report of an event, they coded the necessary information based on that 
report. If the same event was spotted again, this report was also coded. 
Different event reports were then aggregated in a final event dataset. 
The dataset covers 2191 events and 7288 corresponding event reports. 
All newspapers were scanned a second time for missed events. Two inde-
pendent coders have a congruence of around 85 percent for the selec-
tion of events after double-checking (tested on a sub-sample). Inter-coder 
reliability scores (Krippendorff alphas) for the variables used in the 
analyses are higher than 0.77 (Krippendorff 2013).
To aggregate events, we combined information on the actors involved, 
types of violence mentioned, and the dynamics of violence or who 
started/committed the violence. The aggregation of events relied on 
time, location, and actor information but was done conservatively: if 
there was a good probability that two reports concerned the same event, 
they were ultimately coded as one event in the aggregated dataset. The 
aggregation of the violence dynamics variable is particularly important 
in the purview of this study. The variable on who started the violence 
includes five answer categories: Actor A, Actor B, Actors accuse each 
other (disputed statements on who was responsible for the start of the 
violence), unknown (e.g., a PDP-APC “clash” occurred), or Not appli-
cable (in case of a peaceful protest). When there is one report stating 
Actor A started the violence, or multiple reports which do not deny this 
finding, the aggregate event will state Actor A committed the violence. 
If, however, multiple reports in the same newspaper disagree (e.g. due 
to new party statements dismissing allegations), the coding will be “accuse 
each other.” As such, our analyses focus on the aggregate message news-
papers disseminate on electoral violence events.
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Empirical analyses
Firstly, we focus our analysis on selection bias or the question of whether 
the three newspapers select different types of events into the news. Secondly, 
we analyze whether event inclusion is related to the electoral calendar. 
Thirdly, we analyze the spatial distribution of political conflict events, and 
whether events are related to electoral competitiveness at the state level. 
Fourthly, we focus on the issue of description bias, or whether the same 
events are reported in different ways by the newspapers.
Selection bias in The Guardian, This Day, and The Nation
The occurrence of a range of events can be related to the proximity to elec-
tions. In the quantitative literature, “electoral violence” or “violence related 
to elections” has been conceptualized in different ways. Staffan I. Lindberg 
(2006), for instance, focuses on events that are explicitly linked to the 
electoral process, while Scott Straus and Charlie Taylor (2012) as well as 
Arthur A. Goldsmith (2015) associate different forms of political violence 
witnessed in a country with the electoral process if the violence takes place 
within a specific time frame. Furthermore, the occurrence of elections has 
also been used as a key independent variable in studies focusing on more 
general forms of violence. Ole M. Theisen (2012), for example, finds that 
land scarcity and population pressure do not systematically affect the occur-
rence of armed conflict events in Kenya, but that election years systemati-
cally see more violence. Lars-Erik Cederman et al. (2013) in turn, find that 
competitive elections increase the chance of ethnic civil war onset.
As a range of events is potentially affected by proximity to the electoral 
calendar, we first inspect how many events the three newspapers have 
included by making use of different conceptualizations of conflict. We first 
focus on the general event type categories included in the dataset: protests 
(demonstrations, sit-ins), riots (violent protests or mob justice), kidnap-
pings (kidnapping for non-criminal purposes), armed attacks (assassina-
tion attempts, battles between government troops and rebels, violence 
against civilian populations etc.), and terrorist attacks (IED, suicide bomber, 
car bomb etc.). These categories are mutually exclusive. Secondly, we use 
the Actor variable to distinguish between different types of events which 
have a political nature. A first type, “political party event,” includes all gen-
eral event types, including protests, in which a political party is mentioned 
as an actor. This also includes parties other than the PDP and APC. The 
second and third sub-type only concern violent events in which either the 
APC or the PDP were victims of violence (e.g., secretariat bombing, assassi-
nation). As the conflict and actor coding is done separately for the three 
newspapers, the categorizations are newspaper-specific.
We also focus on the reporting of the Boko Haram conflict, as the 
handling of that crisis has been a major source of criticism of the Jonathan 
administration. Moreover, agitation against the government to “Bring Back 
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Table 1. Event type per newspaper
The Guardian (PDP) This Day (PDP) The Nation (APC)
General event types
All 1058 (100%) 923 (100%) 1393 (100%)
Protest 291 (27.50%) 202 (21.89%) 448 (32.16%)
Riot 83 (7.84%) 67 (7.26%) 119 (8.54%)
Kidnapping 8 (0.75%) 11 (1.19%) 22 (1.58%)
Armed attack 609 (57.56%) 574 (62.19%) 728 (52.26%)
Terrorist attack 67 (6.33%) 69 (7.48%) 76 (5.46%)
Political party events
Alla 217 (100%) 155 (100%) 292 (100%)
APC victim 56 (25.81%) 50 (32.26%) 117 (40.07%)
PDP victim 46 (21.20%) 36 (23.26%) 49 (16.7%)
Boko Haram events
Allb 295 (100%) 379 (100%) 309 (100%)
Boko Haram & civilians 178 (60.34%) 228 (60.16%) 170 (55.02%)
Boko Haram & army 113 (38.31%) 160 (42.22%) 152 (49.19%)
aThe ‘All’ category also contains events which involved other parties than the PDP and APC, as well 
as events which mention a “political party” without specifying the party. The category also includes a 
limited number of protests.
bBoko Haram events can involve the army and civilians at the same time, hence the categories are 
not to be seen as mutually exclusive, or adding up to 100 percent. Furthermore, for a limited number 
of events, Boko Haram is linked to actors other than the army and civilians.
Our Girls” has also been seen as APC-directed, most famously by Patience 
Jonathan, the president’s wife. Including events of Boko Haram killings 
and excluding events related to Nigerian army successes might undermine 
the PDP’s position for the 2015 elections. Again, we use the Actor variable 
to categorize events that include Boko Haram. However, we also make two 
sub-distinctions: events in which Boko Haram attacks civilians and events in 
which the Army is engaged in fighting the insurgents. The former could be 
more prone to overreporting by The Nation (APC), for instance, than the 
latter. The event types are not mutually exclusive, however, as some Boko 
Haram events involve civilians as well as troops at the same time.
Table 1 gives an overview of the event frequencies per newspaper. This 
Table shows that in terms of conflict reporting, The Nation includes the 
most events, while This Day includes the least. All newspapers are more or 
less similar in the number of pages they count, however. Interestingly, The 
Nation includes more conflict events involving political parties, and clearly 
more events that depict the APC as a victim of violence. In contrast to what 
could have been expected, however, The Guardian and This Day also report 
more events in which the APC is a victim than events in which the PDP is 
the victim, even though the discrepancies are less wide. This Day devotes 
most attention to events involving Boko Haram, yet other than this observa-
tion there does not appear to be an immediate bias in the reporting of 
Boko Haram-army or -civilian events. 
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Event reporting and the electoral calendar
We now investigate to what extent the different event types included in 
Table 1 are affected by the electoral calendar. We aim to determine, on 
the one hand, whether events occurred more frequently as the elections 
of March 28–29, 2015, drew closer, and, on the other hand, whether 
there are differences between the newspapers analyzed. Firstly, we look 
at the overall relationship between time and conflict in Nigeria. Figure 1 
shows the cumulative conflict count line as the March 2015 elections 
approached.4 As the dataset starts at April 1, 2014, and ends at March 
30, 2015, the x-axis runs from 362 to -2. The number of conflict counts 
at -2 represent the total count per newspaper in the dataset (see Table 1). 
As Figure 1 demonstrates, there is no clear relationship between the 
elections and conflict events in general in the country, nor are there differ-
ences between newspapers. The cumulative lines steadily progress with-
out clear jumps, which would indicate an acceleration of conflict. A slight 
jump occurs on the election days themselves and is shown by all three 
newspapers. A broad conceptualization of conflict hence does not reveal 
a relationship with the electoral calendar (Goldsmith 2015; Theisen 
2012). We find similar results for the Protest, Armed Attack, and Boko 
Haram events.5
Turning more in depth to the Boko Haram crisis, one can see a rela-
tionship with the electoral calendar. At the beginning of the crisis, the 
Figure 1. Proximity to the 2015 elections and conflict in Nigeria
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slow response of the federal government led to much criticism from civil 
society as well as from opposition parties. Eventually, more troops were 
deployed to the northeast, especially right before the elections, which 
were delayed for six weeks to allow for the operation. As a result, while 
attacks against civilians were more prominent between April and October/
November 2014, they declined somewhat thereafter. Interestingly, this 
decline is only visible in The Guardian (PDP) and The Nation (APC) newspa-
pers. Clashes between Boko Haram and the army in their turn become 
more prominent after September 2014, in particular for The Nation and 
This Day (PDP) papers. It appears that reporting on Boko Haram events is 
hence also not affected by the individual newspapers’ political affiliations. 
As could already be derived from Table 1, more differences are expected 
for events involving political parties. Figures 4 to 6 show how each newspa-
per constructs electoral violence occurrence in the run-up to the 2015 gen-
eral elections. For the broad category of conflict events which involve 
political parties, there is a clear connection with proximity to elections, as 
these events accelerate rapidly as the elections draw nearer. Another inter-
esting feature is that in all three newspapers, reporting of violence victim-
hood becomes more prevalent over time. Indeed, it is not the case that The 
Guardian and This Day will start overreporting violence toward the PDP, as 
compared to The Nation, in the campaign period. The cumulative lines for 
PDP and APC victimhood do not cross or only slightly so (This Day). The 
Nation devotes more attention to APC victimhood in the campaign period, 
Figure 2. The 2015 elections and Boko Haram attacks against civilians
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Figure 3. The 2015 elections and Boko Haram battles with the army
Figure 4. Political violence and proximity to elections (The Guardian)
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Figure 5. Political violence and proximity to elections (This Day)
Figure 6. Political violence and proximity to elections (The Nation)
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however, with the cumulative line accelerating stronger. PDP victimhood is 
largely overlooked.
It is worth emphasizing again that all three newspapers show that the 
APC was more likely to be the victim of violence than the PDP in the pre-
electoral period, regardless of the paper’s political affiliation. Most of this 
violence was perpetrated by PDP actors. This result supports earlier find-
ings by Scott Straus and Charlie Taylor (2012), who argue that the opposi-
tion is most likely to be the victim of electoral violence in the pre-electoral 
period, in contrast to the view of Paul Collier and Pedro C. Vicente (2014), 
who argue the opposite.
The spatial distribution of political party conflict and electoral competitiveness
Previous analyses have focused on general trends on the national level. Here, 
we investigate how conflict relates to electoral competitiveness on the sub-
national level. We only consider conflict events which involved political actors. 
Table 2 gives the top five states per newspaper for political party conflict. There 
is clear agreement that Rivers state and Ekiti states were most prone to conflict 
in the run-up to the 2015 presidential elections, while more disagreement 
arises over other states’ relative position in the ranking. This could perhaps be 
due to differences in regional foci or sales numbers for each newspaper.
Two election moments took place in Ekiti: the governorship election 
in June 2014 and the presidential and legislative elections in March 2015. 
The 2015 vote margins—the differences in vote share between the winner 
and runner-up—for the listed states are (Figure 7): 91 percent for Rivers 
(PDP victory), 17 percent for Ekiti (PDP victory), 21 percent for Osun 
(APC victory), 11 percent for Lagos (APC victory), 16 percent for Edo (PDP 
victory), 3.5 percent for FCT (PDP victory), 88 percent for Akwa Ibom 
(PDP victory), 39 percent for Kwara (PDP victory), 26 percent for Oyo 
(APC victory), 10 percent for Benue (APC victory), 86 percent for Cross 
River (PDP victory), and 84 percent for Ebonyi (PDP victory). 
Interestingly, there is no immediate relationship between party con-
flict and competitiveness. Nonetheless, in Rivers, many results were can-
celled, and bye-elections were eventually won by the APC, indicating 
more competition than first assumed. There is also no relationship 
Table 2. Top 5 states most prone to political conflict per newspaper (number of 
events in brackets)
The Guardian This Day The Nation
Rivers (34) Rivers (30) Rivers (46)
Ekiti/Lagos (20) Ekiti/Federal Capital Territory (15) Ekiti (34)
Osun (15) Edo (11) Lagos (32)
Edo (13) Akwa Ibom/Kwara/Lagos (10) Oyo (17)
Benue (10) Cross River (7) Kwara/ Ebonyi/Osun (15)
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between events reported and the eventual winner of the elections at the 
state level.
Differences in reporting on the same events
While each newspaper reports over 150 conflict events involving political 
parties (see Table 1), only 70 of these events are shared by all newspapers.6 
Lethal events have a higher probability of being shared events. For about 
two-thirds of these events, there are no notable discrepancies between 
newspapers in how they report violence dynamics, including who is the vic-
tim and who is the perpetrator.
Some of the differences that do occur in reporting are in line with the 
expectation that political ties influence the reporting of violence. For 
instance, The Nation reports that a March rally in Lagos by the O’odua 
People’s Congress (OPC) is associated with the PDP, and that violence 
occurred against civilians and APC campaign materials. This description is 
not corroborated by The Guardian, however. This Day reports that APC 
could have also started the violence. A widows’ protest in Imo in February 
2015 degenerates into violence. According to The Guardian, the violence 
was caused by APC thugs, while The Nation accuses the PDP of being behind 
the violence. This Day reflects both views, resulting in an “accuse each 
Figure 7. Vote margin by state, 2015 presidential elections
Source: INEC (2015). Map made with Indiemapper (http://indiemapper.io/app/)
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other” code. An attack on Borno governor Shettima from the APC is 
described as committed by the PDP in The Nation, while This Day speaks of 
“irate youth” and The Guardian of “attackers.” A burning of a PDP campaign 
office is attributed to the APC by The Guardian and This Day, while The 
Nation speaks of “angry youth.”
Yet there are also examples which are not in line with the expectations. 
For example, while This Day and The Nation state that unknown gunmen 
attacked a PDP senator in Akwa Ibom, The Guardian includes allegations 
that PDP thugs themselves committed the attack. Similarly, an attack on the 
brother of Rivers governor Amaechi, who by that time had switched to the 
APC, is specified as perpetrated by the PDP in The Guardian. An attack by the 
APC on another political party is reported in The Nation, while The Guardian 
and This Day do not include statements on who started the violence. 
The comparison of event descriptions generally supports our above find-
ings that political conflict reporting cannot be directly associated with polit-
ical preferences of newspapers.
In the following section, we contextualize these findings further 
through interviews with Nigerian journalists and editors. The interviews tar-
geted various media channels, not restricted to the three newspapers inves-
tigated in the quantitative analyses. The interviews specifically aimed to 
elucidate more clearly how and to what extent reporters allow political affil-
iations to influence their reporting practices, in particular with regard to 
inter-party conflict.
Newspaper politics: biased reporting or editorial preferences?
First of all, it is important to acknowledge that media representatives them-
selves rarely deny the presence of political pressures on reporting:
You know the interests of your proprietor, your management. You self-
impose restrictions, maybe the management would not even stop you.  
I haven’t been told to report something, but I know the management’s 
interest, you should know what they stand for. (Interview YO, Abuja, 
November 30, 2017)
You can only follow the master’s interests. Ownership of media houses has 
always been a problem. Some things cannot be reported. (Interview CA, 
Abuja, December 4, 2017)
We have training and experience, but proprietors’ interests are important, 
what can you do. Press freedom is undermined. Editors may be competent 
but when proprietors are close to political people… (Interview MO, Lagos, 
December 18, 2017)
The well-known Nigerian adage with regard to media reporting, “He who 
pays the piper determines his tune” (Interview PO, Lagos, December 19, 
2017), is clearly supported.7
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Nonetheless, this does not mean that Nigerian newspapers blindly let 
themselves be turned into tools for political propaganda. While political 
ties can influence the tone and style of reporting, the occurrence of 
electoral violence is not necessarily actively misreported:
Political parties have built synergies with media houses. They have their 
publicity departments, they try to gather, process, and disseminate infor-
mation themselves and try to carry journalists along by sending press 
reports, photos etc.… There are also situations where political actors try 
to use media to make unsubstantiated claims. We want balance and 
hence cross-check: is there evidence? If not, there is probably an ulterior 
motive and we can choose not to report at all.… Political ties yes, but this 
does not mean that if they perpetrate violence that we do not report this. 
It molds your opinion to report them more favorably but you are not 
blindly promoting them. For example, if they would do an action to pro-
mote peace you would put them on the front page and not tuck them 
away if they patronize you. Or if they have an accident on the campaign 
trail, you would put ’10 PDP members die in accident’ on the front page, 
while other newspapers would perhaps do page five. (Interview MU, 
Abuja, December 1, 2017)
Interviewees also point out other editorial strategies:
Politicians try to woo journalists and influence them and paint opponents 
in a bad lights. ... You see political affiliation in the newspapers. If it is 
against the APC, you will not see it in The Nation or tucked inside, watered 
down or the narrative changed. If there was an incident, they don’t report 
the incident but interview someone on the incident, condemning it. 
(Interview AO, Abuja, December 4, 2017)
Interestingly, the issue of leaving out some events is also pointed out by the 
interviewee. Yet as our quantitative analyses indicate, this might occur at a 
smaller scale but not so that it causes severe biases.
News media also seem to be particularly conscious of upholding profes-
sional standards in the face of political influences:
Yes we have the same interests as PDP, so we would mellow PDP  
violence down. But there is also the national interest: we are not reporting 
deaths without confirmation. (Interview IO, Abuja, December 4, 2017)
They can try to pull strings but the Nigerian media are stronger. Maybe in 
editorial policies but not actual news. (Interview AS, Abuja, December 7, 
2017)
We try to be professional. We reflect opinions of parties in a balanced way. 
It can be difficult to escape the proprietor’s interest, you always make sure 
you look out for this. This person is paying your salary, so you protect their 
interest, but there are still the ethics of the profession. (Interview LM, 
Abuja, December 12, 2017)
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Indeed, most claim that when it comes to reporting on electoral violence, 
“we tell it as it is” (Interview PO, Lagos, December 19, 2017). A representa-
tive of The Guardian puts it as follows:
We report political violence as it is. We always confirm our reports, balance 
them, report the angle from the other side. No-one can accuse us of bias. 
People are always saying we are pro-PDP. Most newspapers are privately 
owned but the publisher has its own interests, political affiliations. That’s 
why people see biases and complain, but we try to balance as much as pos-
sible. (Interview AS, Lagos, December 18, 2017)
The interviews indicate that electoral violence reporting is mostly sen-
sitive to editorial changes rather than deliberate misreporting or under/
overreporting. Nigerian media appear to be highly conscious of upholding 
professional ethics and verify information as much as possible. There is a 
potential risk, however, with the perceived need to be as balanced as pos-
sible: “They’ll sue the editor and reporter, but not the publisher. So we try 
to avoid things, misrepresentations” (Interview IO, Abuja, December 4, 
2017). If reporters allow for balance or the representation of both sides in 
an event of electoral violence, this gives both parties the opportunity to 
make allegations and/or deny involvement. Ultimately, this creates uncer-
tainty over violence dynamics and results in a story in which no one is per-
petrator or victim. This can be problematic if media want to play a true 
watchdog role by reporting cases of political violence. This also runs 
together with structural problems in terms of information access. Reporters 
remain very much dependent on political statements and sources for 
reporting without in-depth investigation by journalists (Ciboh 2017). Below, 
we highlight some of these issues by drawing on some examples of electoral 
violence reports of The Guardian, This Day, and The Nation. While our quan-
titative coding does not necessarily reveal differences for these events, we 
can trace the influence of editorial policies qualitatively.
An interesting series of events concerns the “Edo crisis” of October 
2014. The crisis consisted of an attack on a PDP representative of the 
State House of Assembly, followed by an attack on APC delegates at 
Benin airport, and a much more publicized attack on the APC legislative 
quarters in the city. The Nation devotes its front and following pages to 
the event, together with pictures of the vandalized vehicles of APC law-
makers. The balance standard is still held high, however, as the PDP is 
quoted as denying the party’s culpability, while blaming the perpetrators 
of the previous attack on the PDP member as being behind the incident. 
This Day devotes a full page to the event, but interestingly only includes 
APC statements (October 14, 2014:11). The Guardian reports the 
attack on APC members, but also emphasizes PDP fears of a reprisal attack 
(October 13, 2014:86). The Guardian also reports on the airport attack, 
but the same report first details Jonathan’s arrival at the airport and his 
message to Edo (October 11, 2014:3). The Nation starts with the attack 
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and reports on the President’s message in the second part of the report 
(October 11, 2014:3).
Other major events follow similar editorial policies, including the Ekiti 
high court attack by PDP thugs in September 2014, the assassination of a 
PDP member following this event, and the eventual counter-attack on 
APC offices; the teargassing of the House of Representatives Speaker 
Aminu Tambuwal (APC) at the National Assembly in Abuja in November 
2014; and the Okrika (Rivers state) bombing and shooting at an APC rally 
in February 2015. The Nation generally devotes more attention to APC 
victimhood in terms of number of reports, visuals and language, but still 
lends voice to the PDP to comment on allegations. This Day and The 
Guardian appear generally more neutral and toned down. A slight bias can 
be discerned for The Guardian, which pays no attention to the “impeach-
ment plot” associated with the attack on Speaker Tambuwal, and does not 
devote the front page to the Okrika attack, but rather only a headline on 
the first page.
The confusion that can be raised by overemphasizing balance is per-
haps best illustrated by an incident involving APC governor Kayode 
Fayemi of Ekiti state in June 2014, in the run-up to the governorship elec-
tions. A rally for PDP candidate Ayo Fayose was followed by an APC coun-
ter-rally led by governor and candidate Fayemi of the APC. Police were 
initially said to have killed an APC member while dispersing the protest, 
which led to strong condemnations by the APC and concerns that the 
police would interfere in favor of the PDP during the elections. However, 
the accusation was countered by the PDP, which declared that the person 
killed was actually a PDP member, while the perpetrators were APC mem-
bers. To cover up the crime, the APC perpetrators supposedly took off the 
PDP member’s Fayose shirt and replaced it with an APC shirt. While The 
Nation devotes most attention to the APC statements, all sides and narra-
tives are represented in news reports of the three papers. In the end, by 
focusing on balance and the repetition of party statements rather than 
in-depth journalism, the question of guilt becomes unsolvable.
While Nigerian news media hold professional standards such as impar-
tiality and balance high in the reporting of inter-party violence, these 
standards, as well as their dependence on political representatives for infor-
mation, also appear to undermine their watchdog role. Indeed, care for 
balance—and fears for litigations—lead to reports on “alleged attacks” by 
“suspected members of party X,” which give voice to a range of conspiracy 
theories often marring Nigerian political debate. While political biases do 
not appear to majorly affect reporting and are usually limited to editorial 
placement, this issue still undermines the reporting of electoral violence in 
Nigeria.
Finally, it is also worth mentioning that the extent to which editorial 
policies affect quantitative event coding is dependent on the coding pol-
icies. For our dataset, we scanned through the entire newspaper issues, for 
instance. Coding schemes which rely on issue front pages might result in 
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more severe biases. As Table 3 indicates, the difference between APC and 
PDP victimhood remains similar when only looking at events included in 
first page articles and headlines, yet the difference becomes (even) more 
exaggerated for The Nation.
Conclusion
This study has analyzed to what extent electoral violence reporting in 
Nigeria is influenced by newspapers’ political affiliation, using quantitative 
and qualitative analysis methods. Overall, we found that political biases in 
the reporting of electoral violence remain limited, but that they are more 
pronounced for newspapers owned by politicians (The Nation) than pri-
vately owned papers (The Guardian, This Day). Biases also appear more pre-
dominant at the level of editorial policies (e.g. page and size of the report, 
inclusion of visuals).
These results, first of all, have implications for the perception of the 
quality of Nigerian news media. While political pressures are acknowledged, 
we find that Nigerian news media can still be considered professional out-
lets with a credible role in challenging lingering authoritarianism, political 
corruption, and, indeed, violent conflict. The latter is subjected to a caveat, 
however, in particular due to the stress Nigerian media representatives put 
on balance, and their reliance on political sources for information.
A second important implication of our study concerns the actual pat-
terns of electoral violence in Nigeria. Regardless of political preference, all 
newspapers investigated included more events in which the APC was the 
victim of violence than the PDP. This supports the view that it is indeed the 
incumbent who is responsible for most pre-electoral violence. Furthermore, 
electoral violence in Nigeria mostly took place in the south-south and 
southwest regions, hence differing from the 2011 post-electoral violence, 
and returning to the pattern of the 2007 elections. These sub-national pat-
terns highlight important differences between regions in the occurrence of 
pre- and post-electoral violence. Finally, although electoral violence is com-
monly related to electoral competitiveness (Höglund 2009:421–22), we did 
not find a relationship between conflict and the vote margin in the presi-
dential elections at the state level (although official vote margins are of 
course not a perfect indicator for competitiveness).
The third implication concerns the validity of local African news media 
as empirical sources of information. In many African countries, including 
Table 3. Electoral violence in The Guardian, This Day, and The Nation, front page 
only
The Guardian (PDP) This Day (PDP) The Nation (APC)
APC victim 12 11 31
PDP victim 7 5 1
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Nigeria, the degree of freedom of the press is considered “partly free” by 
the Freedom House index. This rating does not necessarily imply that local 
newspapers are overly biased, however. Indeed, while press freedom indica-
tors can be useful to assess and compare media climates, our research dem-
onstrates that they do not necessarily hold implications for the reliability of 
media reporting. Exactly how constraints on press freedom affect journalis-
tic practice is hence still open for further research and debate.
Although more research is needed to assess whether Nigeria is excep-
tional or not, our findings suggest that even with a “partly free” rating, local 
newspapers can be consulted to scientifically investigate political (violence) 
processes. Such studies can be of a qualitative or quantitative nature. It 
remains the case, however, that it is important to be well informed on the 
possible preferences of the news source analyzed, also in terms of editorial 
policies (e.g., when conducting front page analyses only). Informed selec-
tion of African news sources in the study of political violence can indeed 
open up valuable new areas of research.
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Notes
 1.  https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2017/nigeria
 2.  http://nigeriawatch.org/
 3.  Only four newspaper issues could not be consulted. For This Day: January 1, 
2015, July 2, 2014, and June 26, 2014; for The Nation: June 7, 2014.
 4.  All figures are made with Stata version 12.0.
 5.  The Kidnapping, Riot, and Terrorist attack categories have insufficient 
numbers of events for this analysis.
 6.  A shared political party event is an event which is included in all papers and 
in which at least one paper identifies a political actor. Not all newspapers 
hence identify political actors in these events. Only forty-four events exist 
which are shared by all papers and in which all papers identify a political 
actor. This distinction does not substantially alter our findings.
 7.  Quotes are based on field notes, which were preferred over recordings to 
safeguard anonymity and to support openness about a potentially sensitive 
subject.
